Political Participation an Investigative Study by Kiper, Scott
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Honors Theses University Honors Program
5-1992
Political Participation an Investigative Study
Scott Kiper
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kiper, Scott, "Political Participation an Investigative Study" (1992). Honors Theses. Paper 31.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
AN INVESTIGATIVE STUDY  
FOR  
POLS 499  
DR. BARB BROWN  
BY  
SCOTT KIPER  
MAY 12, 1992  
I have always been somewhat perplexed about the 
mechanisms of politics and more specifically, the agents of 
political participation. With no reservations at all, I can 
spit out those magical words, III am a Conservative". 
However, trying to explain why becomes excruciatingly 
painful. I would rather reply that I am ignorant of politics 
altogether than try to articulate the formation of my 
beliefs. Nevertheless, it is a question that has peaked my 
interest for years and one I am determined to answer. Why is 
it that some people vote and others do not? What is 
partisanship in politics and why is it so important? How is 
socialization important in formulating ones beliefs? These 
are some of the questions I will try to answer today. I am 
genuinely convinced that in trying to decipher why people 
vote the way they do it is important to fully understand the 
idea of partisanship and build on that. So with that in mind 
let us plunge into the partisan voting practices of the 
United States Congress. 
Congress' passage of the January 12 1991 resolution 
authorizing the president to use force against Iraq has been 
described as a unique vote of conscience, pitting liberal 
against liberal, conservative against conservative. While 
that notion has some basis in fact, analysis of the Senate 
vote (52-47) and the House vote (250-183), reveals familiar 
political patterns. 
Several key features were apparent in the voting in both 
chambers. First, the votes were highly partisan. In both 
chambers, nearly all Republicans voted to authorize the 
leader of their party to use force in the crisis while the 
great majority of Democrats (68 percent in the House, 82 
percent in the Senate) voted against it. Second, the votes 
of Democratic members were closely related to the 
partisanship of their constituencies. Democrats representing 
districts carried by Michael Dukakis in 1988 were much less 
likely to support the force resolution than were Democrats 
representing districts carried by Bush. Third, the votes had 
regional overtones. Passage of the force resolution could be 
attributed to the support Bush commanded among members in 
both chambers from the South and from senators, in 
particular, from the Rocky Mountain West. If the decision to 
provide war authority to the president had been left to 
members from the East and Midwest, the resolution would have 
failed in both chambers. Southern votes were especially 
critical to the Senate outcome. With 14 of the 22 senators 
from the 11 states of the historical confederacy supporting 
Bush's position, the Dixie vote was decisive. 
The statistical profile of a member voting for the 
resolution suggested a young, white male protestant 
representing a suburban or rural district in which he had 
been elected no sooner than 1980. In other words, the 
typical supporter was a typical Congressional Republican. A 
second category of typical supporter was a Southern Democrat 
from a district that voted heavily for Bush in 1988. Close 
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Leading Scorers: party Unity  
Those who in 1990 most consistently voted with their party's majority against the majority of the other party: 
Senate House 
Adams Symms Evans Hancock 
Democralll RepubUcans Democrats Reptlblicans 
Adams. Wash. 93% Symms, Idaho 93% Evans, III. 97% Hancock, Mo. 98% 
Gore. Tenn. 93 Bums. Mont 92 Levin, Mich. 97 Armey, Texas 95 
Leahy, Vt 93 Nickles, Okla. 91 Hoyer. Md. 96 Burton, Ind. 95 
Sarbanes, Md. 93 Hatch, ·Utah 89 Bonior, Mich. 95 Walker, Pa. 95 
Cranston, Caln. 90 Thurmond, S.C. 89 cardin, Md. 95 Bunning, Ky. 94 
sasser, Tenn. 90 Gam, Utah 88 Gejdenson, Conn. 95 Dreier, calif. 94 
Simon, III. 90 . Gramm, Texas 88 Hayes. III. 95 Herger. cain. 94 
Dodd, Conn. 89 Helms, N.C. 88 Kildee. Mich. 95 Ky!. Ariz. 94 
Kennedy, Mess. _ 89 Wallop, Wyo. 88 Lewis, Ga.. 95 Dannemeyer, Calif. 93 
Mikulski, Md. 89 Coats, Ind. 87 Moakley. Mass. 95 Moorhead, cain. 93 
Milchen, Maine 89 Sabo, Minn. 95 Paxon, N.Y. 93 
Moynihan, N.Y. 89 Studds, Mass. 95 8ensenbrennerI Wis. 93 
Vento, Minn. 95 
l 
Wheat, Mo. 95 .-, 
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Those who in 1990 most consistently voted against their party'. majority: 
House 
Democralll Republlcans Democralll R8ptlbUcans 
Heflin, Ala --~., 46% Jeflords, Vl 61% Stenholm, Texes 47% Conte, Mass. :- ~.71% 
Shelby. Ala. e,,: 
Boren. Okla. 
.. 41 
34 
Hatfield, Ore. 
Cohen, Maine 
58 
53 
Par1<er, Miss. 
Hutto, Fla. 
46 
44 
Horton, N.Y. . 
MoreUa. Md." '.. 
.. :':'66 "". 
'.. 65 .,: 
E,xon, Neb... ' 
Breaux, La. 
34 
31 
Packwood, Ore. 
Heinz, Pat 
53 
47 
Taylor, Miss. 
Hall, Texas 
'43 
41 
·Gilman. N.Y.'· 
Green, N,Y, ....... 
. '::63 "'~;: 
60 . 
Dixon. III. 30 . Specter, Pa 46 Jacobs, Ind. 41 Schneider, R.I.· ... '·57 
Ford, Ky. 30 Ourenberger. Minn. 40 Smill1, N.J. 54 
Johnsten, La. 29 Chafee, R.I. 36 Boehlert N.Y. 52 
Baucus, Mont 28 .. " . 
Stenholm 
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THE ELECTORATE EXAMINED ,  
;I 
In this year's elections for the House of Representatives, familiar voting tendencies of groups played themselves 
out. Voting patterns for the last four off-year elections are shown below. 
ICBS/NYT I
1982 
Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives In this dis-
trict, who dId you just vote for? 
• Voted for DemocratIc candidate iJ Republican J Other • Voted for Democratic candidate sa Republican .• ; Other 
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Moderate 
Conservative 
18-29 
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White 
Black 
Hispanic 
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Independent 
By Ideology 
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By sex 
Men 
Women 
By rece 
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,,Comparing Whiles, BlackS,. and Hispanics 
Compared to whites and blacks, Hispanics are more upbeat about the present course of the country, the job the  
president is doing, and at least relatively, the job Congress is doing.  
HispanicsVOTERS	 Whiles 
Approve of 59% 61%Bush's job 
65% _37%'Disapprove 
_34%Approve of 
.19%Congress's job 
Disapprove 77% 
_30% 
47% 
59%63% 
Abortion should be ... 
Legal in all	 _ 39% 
_39%circumstances  
Only some _ 44%  _40% 
Illegal	 .14% .16% .19% 
Consider sell ...	 !_34% 50%	 ',,',Democrat 73%_35%Republican "27%
Independent	 "27% .20% 
Country on ... 
Right track _~O%.,,· _44%50%.23% 
_44% 
73%'56%'Wrong track 
Issues that mattered the most 
Environment	 • 23% .13% .16% . " ~...... 
Education	 _ 25% 39%
Crime/drugs	 .21% _37% -_38% 
16% 15% 15% 
~-ti~·i 
Abortion	 • 15% 19% 19% 
I 
S&Ls	 ,~ " 
Iraq	 
14% 13% 1 1% ,' ~·'·l 
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behind party as a predictor of members January 12 votes was 
race. Of the 25 voting members of the House who are black, 
only freshman Gary Franks, R-Conn., voted for the resolution. 
Among Hispanic and Asian Americans, the vote was nearly as 
lopsided. Of the 15 Hispanic of Asian Americans voting in 
the two chambers, only three supported Bush. 
If party and race are usually reliable predictors of 
voting behavior, some of the elements of the January 12 
division were more surprising in their effect. Among these 
were the members characteristics of age, seniority and 
religion. In the Senate, in fact, age was a huge factor. 
Altogether, of the 29 senators born before 1930, only nine 
voted in favor of the resolution. And only one of the very 
oldest half-dozen senators, those born before 1920, voted in 
favor. Bush's war resolution was far more popular among 
younger members. Baby boomers, those born between 1946 and 
1964, supported Bush by a 3 to 2 ratio. Seniority seemed to 
produce a similar pattern. Reluctance to authorize force 
seemed to increase with seniority. In the House, amnong the 
164 members voting who had been sworn in before 1981, the 
measure barely prevailed(84-80). Conversely, among those 
sworn in since 1980, Bush won backing by fat margins in both 
chambers, including a 25-19 vote of support among House 
freshmen and a 3-1 vote of support among Senate freshmen. 
The vote also showed notable divisions between members 
along religious lines. The most willing to back Bush were 
those who identify themselves with a Protestant church. 
Among Catholics, by contrast, support for the war fell just 
below 50 percent in the Senate and below 36 percent in the 
House. An even more noteable result by religion was the near 
even split among Jewish members. Bush's resolution failed 
among Jewish members by a score of 16-17 in the House and 3-5 
in the Senate. This was surprising because the crisis is 
generally viewed as a threat to Israel. 
In all, Republican support for the president's position 
could hardly have been more complete. All but three of the 
167 House Republicans (98 percent) voted for force, as did 
all but two of the 44 GOP members in the Senate(95 percent). 
Now that we more fully understand the magnitude of 
partisanship we can begin to look at some of the factors and 
values that cause it and come into play when we go to the 
ballot box. 
Demographics plays a very important role in 
partisanship. Let us now turn to an example of changes in 
Partisanship by Demographic groups. In the 1950's the simple 
fact of being a Southerner was sufficient reason for most to 
identify as Democrats; many had been born into the Democratic 
party in much the same way they had been born into a given 
church. Their political identity was overwhelmingly defined 
by where they lived, as opposed to who they were in terms of 
religion, social status, etc. In contrast, comparable data 
from the 1980 Super Tuesday study show many significant 
relationships in the new South, which now virtually match 
those in the rest of the country. The most important 1988 
pattern is that of age. The fact that citizens under 30 are 
by far the most Republican whereas those over 65 are the most 
Democratic should benefit the GOP for a generation to come, 
as population replacement takes its toll. 
Another aspect of the New Deal party system which made 
little imprint on the old South was the role of social 
status, as measured by either family income or education. 
The Democrats in the old South were "the symbol of small 
town, middle-class respectability." Thus in the 1950's low 
income and a grade school education actually decreased the 
likelihood of Democratic identification among white 
southerners in the 1950's. 
As the South industrialized socioeconomic patterns of 
partisanship came to resemble those of the North. 16 percent 
of white southerners who belonged to a union household in the 
1950's were slightly more likely to be Democrats. By 1988 
this unionized group had declined to 9 percent, but the 
difference in partisanship compared to the rest of the 
population had increased greatly. As the South has moved 
beyond industrialization to high technology, increasing 
education and income levels have substantially contributed to 
the GOP gains. The middle and upper middle income categories 
are now major sources of Republican strength. As grade 
school educated citizens have dwindled, this aging remnant of 
the old South has gone from the least to the most Democratic 
of the education categories. In contrast, among college 
graduates a 54 percent advantage for the Democrats in the 
1950's has been transformed into a 31 percent edge for the 
Republicans in 1988. This example of the Southern states is 
a clear indication of the power that Partisanship plays on 
voting behavior and party affiliation. Further, this example 
clearly illustrates that those individuals who are young, 
well educated and have money identify more closely with the 
Republican party. Now let us turn to another example of 
Partisan shifts which is a little closer to home. 
Illinois is a classic example of split-level politics. 
The Democrats have not carried Illinois in a presidential 
election since 1964. And they have'nt won a contest for 
governor since 1972. Yet Democrats occupy both U.S. Senate 
seats and have held a majority of House seats since 1982. 
Democrats took control of both state legislative houses in 
1974 and have held them for all but two years since. 
Realignment shows up most clearly in Chicago. White 
ethnics are less Democratic than they used to be, while 
blacks and liberals are more Democratic. Blacks in Illinois 
went from about three-quarters Democratic in the 1950's to 
over 90 percent in the decades since. Chicago's white ethnic 
voters have moved in the opposite direction. Their support 
for the Democratic ticket dropped to 50 percent in the 
1960's, rose in the 1970's, then collapsed during the Reagan 
years. These are the White Democratic "regulars" who gave 
John Kennedy 62 percent of their vote. They gave Walter 
Mondale 37 percent, and Michael Dukakis 44 percent, thus 
costing him Illinois. 
The "lakefront liberal" vote-educated, upper-middle 
class whites on the north side moved in the opposite 
direction. Lakefront liberals and white ethnics clash over 
cultural politics. Like blacks, white liberals became more 
Democratic in the 1960's as white ethnics became less 
Democratic. In the 1970's the Democrats picked up support 
from white ethnics and lost ground among lakefront liberals. 
The return of cultural politics in the 1980's brought 
educated liberals back to the Democratic party and drove 
white ethnics away. Chicago's growing hispanic vote now 
holds the balance of power in city elections. Hispanics vote 
more like blacks than like white ethnics. But the trend in 
the hispanic vote during the 1980's is like that of white 
ethnics- anti Democratic. 
One reason why realignment seems to be a Chicago 
phenomenon is Chicago's recent history of racial politics. 
In his two mayoral victories (1983 and 1987), Harold 
Washington took almost all of the black vote but less than 10 
percent of the white ethnic vote. Nevertheless, the 
polarization of Chicago politics began long before the 
1980's. It started with the cultural clashes of the 1960's. 
Even while Richard J. Daley held the Democratic organization 
vote together in mayoral elections, racial and ideological 
divisions were becoming stronger in national and state 
voting. The downstate voters were unaffected by realignment, 
consistently voting in the low 40s for Democratic 
presidential tickets, in the high 40s for statewide 
Democrats. Similarly, suburban whites have voted in the low 
30s for presidential Democrats, in the high 30s for statewide 
Democrats. 
But that continuity disguises important demographic 
shifts. Illinois is divided into 3 geographic components: 
Chicago, the suburbs, and downstate. During the 1950's, 
Chicago accounted for about 40 percent of the Illinois vote. 
Today, it is 25 percent. The suburban share of the vote has 
mushroomed from 22 to 36 percent. The downstate vote has 
remained stable while Chicago's percentage of the state total 
vote has gotten smaller, it has also gotten more Democratic 
(from 60 percent Democratic in the 1950's to about 70 percent 
today). While the Republican vote in the suburbs has 
remained stable <about 60 percent), that vote has more weight 
today. These two changes have altered Illinois' politics. 
By the 1960's, the suburban vote offset the Chicago vote 
with equal numbers of voters. Chicago voted 63 percent 
Democratic, the suburbs 61 percent Republican. Downstate 
Illinois cast the swing vote-usually narrowly Republican. By 
the 1980's, the suburban vote was much larger than the 
Chicago vote. Even though Democrats regularly come out of 
Chicago these days with a 400,000 vote edge, they can get 
swamped in the suburbs-which is what happens in presidential 
elections. 
In sum, realignment has solidified a liberal Democratic 
base in Chicago. Realignment has also swelled the size of 
the Republican vote in the suburbs. White ethnics did not 
just move out of the Democratic party. They also moved out 
of the city, and ended up voting just as Republican as their 
neighbors. It used to be the case that Republicans carried 
Illinois by cutting into the big Chicago vote. Now Democrats 
carry Illinois by cutting into the big suburban and downstate 
vote. We have talked thus far about Partisanship and how 
changes in Partisanship effect voting behavior. What I would 
like to do now is move our focus to some of the different 
factors that come into play when we go to the ballot box and 
discuss why they are a driving force in determining why some 
people vote and others do not. 
The central finding of survey-level studies of 
contemporary American voter turnout is that formal education 
is the most powerful predictor of voting. The more education 
a person has, the more likely he is to vote. This finding 
results from national studies; however, virtually no research 
has been conducted to determine whether this pattern of 
participation exists within the individual states. 
There is good reason to expect that the pattern of voter 
participation many well vary from one state to the next. An 
examination of the "theory" of voter participation implicit 
in much of the research on American voter turnout suggests 
the basis for this expectation. According to this theory, an 
individual is likely to vote if the motivation to vote 
exceeds the obstacles to voting. Sources of motivation may 
be internal or external. "Internal'· sources of motivation 
include such attitudes as partisan identification, "political 
j  
Gender and Education Comp~risons~~~;~fr'  
Women who went to the polls were less likely to approve of the job the president is doing and more negative 
about the country's direction than men who turned out. Those with the least and those with the most formal 
education tend to differ on a wide range of issues. 
VOTERS Men Women SomeH.S. 
Approve of 53% _37%58%Bush's job 
Oisappro~e _36% _40% 
Approve of • 17% .17%Congress's job 
Disapprove 70% 73% 80%76% 
Abortion should be ...  
Legal in all _ 38%  _41% _26%circumstances ~. 
Only some _ 46% _41% _46% _37%.23% .9%Illegal .,4% .15% 
Consider sell ... _ .. _39% 46% _35%Democrat 32% _34%
Republican _34%'" _31% 
Independent _27%"  .23% "'29% 
Ideology 
Uberal 18% .20% .,7% .22%..:::;  
"::"':.  •
i 
_30%
Conservative _35% "28% _35% r:.l .';" .... _47%"Moderate _'\1% _46% _38% 
".;~t.> Country on ... ..-".'.", -. ~/' 
',;" . Right track _42% _32% 
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111% 
14% 
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.23%_31%.22% 
15% ..: 
.19% 
13% 
?-.' . Wrong track 51% 
efficacy", Ilsense of civic duty", and Il po litical trust ll The• 
strong association between such attitudes and voting was 
established in the early voting studies and has been 
frequently confirmed. l'External" sources of motivation are 
electoral activities, i.e., the voter registration and get 
out and vote efforts of candidates, parties, and other 
organizations. That electoral activities can foster 
participation has been attested to in a variety of research 
contexts. Survey research at various levels of elections has 
shown that persons contacted by candidate and party 
volunteers are more likely to vote than persons not 
contacted. County and precinct studies have demonstrated 
that the mobilization efforts of candidates and party 
organizations can stimulate turnout. Recent studies also 
indicate that campaign spending levels, utilized as 
indicators of electoral mobilization effort, are positively 
associated with turnout levels in state and congressional 
elections. Finally, several authors have concluded that 
electoral or party competition, seen as a stimulus to 
electoral activity, fosters voter participation. 
The primary obstacles to voting are voter registration 
laws, which evidence suggests are best viewed as barriers 
citizens must overcome in order to vote. Comparitive, 
historical, and cross-sectional studies have reached this 
conclusion. Comparitive researchers have found that low 
turnout rates in the United States, relative to Western 
Europe, can be explained at least partially in terms of 
American State registration requirements. Research has 
demonstrated that the introduction of personal registration 
laws around the turn of the century clearly had a depressing 
effect on turnout levels. Turnout studies have consistently 
found that restrictive registration laws lower voter turnout 
rates. Researchers have concluded that voter registration 
laws are particularly severe obstacles to voting for persons 
with little or no formal education. Given the unequal 
effects of registration laws as obstacles to voting and the 
variation in state registration laws, it follows that one 
would expect the turnout gap between the more educated and 
the less educated to be greater in states with more 
restrictive registration laws than states with less 
restrictive laws. 
A quite different theory which deals with why people do 
and do not vote is the amount of integration into community 
life each voter has. More precisely, this theory holds that 
voting participation, beyond all other factors, will be 
higher among persons who are more fully integrated into their 
communities, finding satisfaction in the community life. 
The direction of the vote - Republican or Democratic 
can be explained as a seeking of benefits, however general. 
In this sense, voting does appear to be rational, a logical 
consequence of partisan loyalties, of issue preferences, and 
of candidate evaluation. The costs of making a correct 
choice are sensibly reduced when voters use cues such as 
partisanahip. 
When deciding whether to vote at all, however, voters 
are more likely to emphasize costs that are immediate (time, 
obtaining information, finding the polling place, etc.), 
while the benefits are distant at best. The chance that one 
vote will make a difference is so astronomical that it cannot 
be worth the effort on purely rational grounds of costs and 
benefits. Indeed, on this basis, it is difficult to 
understand why anyone would vote at all in an election larger 
than a rural high school contest. 
For the current study, five individual attitudes were 
examined: strwength of partisanship, external efficacy, 
internal efficacy, interest in the campaign, and citizen 
duty. It stands to reason that people are more likely to 
vote if they are strongly committed to a political party, if 
they find the world of politics responsive, understandable, 
and interesting, and if they accept the conventional cicic 
obligation to vote. All of these attitudes showed 
consistent, though varied, relationships to turnout in the 
elections of 1984 and 1988. These attitudes were also found 
to be helpful in explaining a notable decline in strong 
partisanship during this period, as well as a decided decline 
in external efficacy and a possible decline in citizen duty. 
Measuring the impact of two of these factors -
partisanship and external efficacy - Ruy Teixeira found that 
they accounted for 38 percent of the drop in turnout from 
1960 to 1980. Conversely, he found these two factors 
accounted for 46 percent of the increase in turnout between 
1980 to 1984. Still, the puzzle is not completely solved. 
We need to look beyond these individualistic causes. These 
explanations, however, leave something out; they leave out 
the local flavor of an election and its social character. 
Urban machines brought voters to the polls not only 
because voters were paid for their ballots, but because 
voting was an expression of the voters integration into a 
local, typically ethnic, network of personal associations. A 
noted political scientist, George Washington Plunkitt, 
illustrated the connection between political participation, 
in this case in Fourth of July celebrations and community 
identity. "When the Fourth of July comes, the reformers, 
with Revolutionary names parted in the middle, run off to 
Newport or the Adirondacks to get out of the way of the noise 
and everything that reminds them of the glorious day. How 
different it is with Tammany! The very constitution of the 
Tammany Society requires that we must assemble at the wigwam 
on the Fourth, regardless of the weather, and listen to the 
reading of the Declaration of Independence and patriotic 
speeches" . 
The focus of this theory is the integration of voters 
into their communities. This integration is achieved as 
close face to face relationships in three contexts: the 
family, the residential community, and peer groups. Family, 
residence, and group affiliations are viewed as different 
aspects of the social correctedness of individuals, as some 
of the ways in which they separate themselves from the 
"lonely crowd", and become part of active political networks. 
To test the relationship of community integration to 
turnout, eight variables that provide reasonably appropriate 
measures of integration into individuals immediate social 
surroundings, and of their committment to their communities. 
In contrast to psychological attitudes, we will deal here 
with actual behavior. The first variable - being married 
represents a personal committment to the small community of 
the family. This theory expects a higher turnout among 
married people. A similar committment would be evidenced by 
raising children. 
Three other variables represent committment to the 
residential community. We should expect higher turnout among 
persons who own, rather than rent, their homes; and who have 
lived longer in their current home. The final four variables 
represent committment to group communities. We should expect 
higher turnout among persons who are more frequent 
churchgoers; who come from families with union members; who 
discuss politics frequently; and who belong to or take part 
in formal organizations of those people to whom they feel 
closest. For example, a religious group for those who feel 
closest to their coreligionsists. 
Changes in the distribution of these characteristics 
among the national population can help explain the decline in 
national turnout. Teixeira, the leading analyst of these 
changes, points to the significant increase in unmarried 
adults and in residential mobility among Americans as major 
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Exit pollsters gave voters a list of groups and asked if they identified with them. Three are shown below. Using this ap-
proach, we can examine groups whose numbers are usually too small for analysis. Self-described gays and lesbians, 
for example, are pessimistic about the country's direction, anti-Bush, and strongly Republican, 
VOTERS	 Attend religious services at least Labor union members GayS/Lesbians 
once a month 
Approve of 
63% 49% _20%Bush's job  
Disapprove _34%  78% 
Approve of _20% 
49% 
.19%	 .15%Congress's job 
Abortion should be '"  
Legal in all _  
43%circumstances 27%  
Only some  42%  
Illegal _21% .13%  
Consider sell ",  
Democrat _33%  
50% 
I  
48% _27%  
Republican 39% _21%  51% 
Independent _25% _28% .18% 
Ideology _23%liberal .15~ 74%_29%Conservative _38%  
Moderate 45%  ~~'o 
. ~..i. _~~~,,-:~ 
Country on ...  
Right track  .19% 
Wrong track 81% 
Issues that mattered the most 
Environment 
54% 
_20% 68% 
Education _28%_23%Crime/drugs 
Hoe.: VOters were asked, 'Are you any ollhe fOllowing (check as many u apply): first time voter, retired, married. currentfy employed, member 01 a labor union. attend religious services 811easl: orcs a month. 
streng feminist, have an immediate family member in the armed 1orc:esIreserve. gay or lesbian?' 
SourcI: Survey by Voter Research and $urveys.Novemtler ~ 1990.'... .- ::-::--:"" i~-:-:- -_.-; -7'···'·~·· '" 
~~:- ---
". ~ .. ' .' 
.7% 
.18% 
13% S&Ls :' 
Iraq' 
Abortion 
Disapprove 75% 76% 43% 
factors, accounting for almost 18 percent of the drop in 
voting participation. It is clearly evident that community 
integration has a definite impact on voter turnout. 
Through the course of this essay I have identified 
numerous theories, values, and ideals which relate strongly 
to voter participation in the electorate. I have studied the 
principles of partisanship and socialization, and through 
specific case studies proved that they have a controlling 
influence on voting behavior. Finally, I have analyzed a 
number of shifts in partisanship and voting behavior and 
shown how this effects the overall makeup of the electorate. 
I feel that because of my intensive study, my grasp of the 
different agents which effect political participation is much 
firmer. It is my genuine concern that the reader feels 
likewise. 
•  
